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TOP SECRET

TICOM/I - 13

INTERROGATION OF OBERST LTN. FRIEDRICH

This is a composite report on the interrogations of Oberst Lt. Friedrich (IC General Nachrichten Fuehrer 3 Abteilung, G.A.F. Sig. Int. Organization) carried out in the field (18/5/45) and at ADIK (9/6/45) by Dr. Pickering.

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Please notify Lt. Pendergrass, PBX 163, if additional distribution of this publication is advisable.

I INTERROGATION OF OBERSTLTN. FRIEDRICH (i.c. General Nachrichtenfuhrer, 3 Abteilung: GAF Sigint Organisation) at the OKL Barracks in BERCHTESGADEN, 18/5/45).

1) P/W had already supplied the attached Order of Battle of GAF Sigint units. It contains all the known units including the CHI Stelle Ob.d.L., the former NEUER MARSTALL organisation. (CHI Stelle has become Luftnachrichtenabt. 350 and passed into the orbit of Director General of GAF Signals. It was formerly independent).

2) Abteilung 350 (CHI Stelle Ob.d.L.) is believed by FRIEDRICH to be in the INNSBRUCK-IMST area. FRIEDRICH had to be reminded of the existence of Regierungsrat VOEGELE of CHI Stelle, the chief GAF cryptographer. He blushed and said "It had been hoped to keep him out of enemy hands; since you know him already, however, VOEGELE accompanied Abteilung 350 into the INNSBRUCK area and has been reported in MURNAU".

He stated that the old Referate (specialist branches) of CHI Stelle persist in Abt. 350, viz :

Referat A: General and organisation
 B: Great Britain (under Obltn. BECKER)
 B5 USA
 C: Mediterranean (Under Hauptmann HUEBNER)
 D: Russia
 E: Cryptography

NOTE: CHI Stelle has always coped with the air forces of all fronts. Its interests have included much more than codes and cyphers (which concern only Referat E) e.g. order of battle, equipment, a/c types, navigational aids, etc., etc. The other Regiments under FRIEDRICH, 351, 352, 353, are the specialists on Western, Mediterranean and Eastern front Air Order of Battle.

FRIEDRICH can not give full details of the reorganisation by which his Regiments 351, 352, etc. emerged, in last minute alibi, from Funkhorchregiment West Etc. This would have to be clarified by his Regimental Commanders. FRIEDRICH's job was to unite the former intercept units and the Radar plotting, route-tracking and jamming units under his own command: as will be seen from the order of battle they are now all on his establishment.

Asked about cryptographers (after overcoming his initial reluctance to speak about VOEGELE) FRIEDRICH said:

He got nothing from OKW


VOEGELE had recently taken to drink.

He had had practically nothing from his cryptographers for the past two years and had concentrated on much more profitable lines: route-tracking, etc.

RAF 4-figure traffic had not been read since 1942.

'KAERUN' (CHI Stelle Ob.d.L., Referat B) when located at PARIS-ASNIERES had intercepted and broken U.S. non-morse teleprinter traffic between WASHINGTON and EUROPE. This success was maintained throughout owing to the lamentable insecurity of the operators. The Germans had therefore always known all details of ferry flights, strength of the U.S. Air Force in Europe and a good deal about training and replacements.

II ORDER OF BATTLE OF GAF SIGINT UNITS (According to FRIEDRICH, after the final reorganisation at the beginning of 1945).



LN Rgt. 351 under Major Ristow.

I, II and III Abteilungen. Tasks: Allied Air Forces in England-France. Air to Air, Ground to Air, Ground to Ground, incl. navigational aids.

LN Rgt. 352 under Major Feichtner.

I and II Abteilungen. Tasks: Allied Air Forces in Mediterranean area. As for Rgt. 351.

LN Rgt. 353 under Oberst Eick.

I, II and III Abteilungen. Russian Air Force. As for Rgt. 351.

LN Abt. 355 under Major Camerlander. Allied Air Forces in Northern area; Russian Air Force in North Norway. Ground to ground, Air to Air according to reception conditions.

LN Abt. 356 under Hptm. Trattner. Task: route tracking of Allied Air Forces on basis of Radar interception and in collaboration with LN Abt. 357.

LN Abt. 357 under Hptm. Rueckheim. Allied 4-engined formations and route tracking on basis of intercepted signals and in collaboration with LN Abt. 356.

LN Abt. 358? Training.

LN Abt. 359? under Hptm. de Wilde: Jamming.

III

FURTHER INTERROGATION OF OBERSTLTN. FRIEDRICH AT ADIK. ON 9/6/45.

Oberstlt. FRIEDRICH spoke freely, for about two hours about his organisation. He took as his agenda the order of battle of his organisation, reproduced above.

A) The submitted order of battle requires modification or footnotes, arising out of answers to interrogators' questions, as follows:

- 1) the personnel of FRIEDRICH's organisation were subordinated for discipline to Oberst. FORSTER, Leitstelle der Funkaufkl. Ob. & L. (This is not indicated in the diagram).
- 2) "LN. Abt. 359?". When an interrogator asked whether there was not a IV Abt. of Rgt. 351, FRIEDRICH pointed to the entry LN Abt. 359? Hptm. de Wilde, and said that was the IV Abt. IV Abt/351 operated with units widely dispersed. The primary reason for rechristening it with an independent number was to prevent postal authorities from sending the Abt. mail to Rgt.
- 3) Footnotes: FRIEDRICH can remember the following details of the reorganisation which resulted in the emergence of the new Regiments:

Regiment 351:

I/351 comprises 1, 2, 25 and 26 companies. Of these
 25/351 is the former 14/LN Rgt. 3.
 26/351 is the signals liaison Coy. of the Regt.

Regiment 353:

I/353 is former III/LN Rgt. 1
 III/353 " III/LN Rgt. 4
 II/351 combines elements of
 W 21 (a remnant of the 1942 organisation, which
 was in a decrepit state)
 9/LN Rgt. 35
 9/LN Rgt. 38

Abt. 357 is former I/Fu. Ho. Rgt. West.

B) FRIEDRICH made the following more general observations on the structure and working of his 'Y' Service.

- 1) A 'Y' service is always a mirror of the behaviour of the enemy. Regiments 351 and 352, directed against the Western Allies in the West and Med. respectively, differ from Regiment 353, directed against the Russians.

Horchdienst and Nachrichtenaufklaerung; the interception reading and exploitation of W/T and R/T signals had, by the end of the war, practically died out in the West; only Abt. 357 plotted the course of raids on the basis of content of intercepted signals: even in this task, it cooperated with Abt. 356. In the East, however, Horchdienst was still the mainstay of 'Y'. The Russian Air Force (with the exception of the A.D.D. - strategic bomber force turned to transport -- against which route-tracking methods could be employed) is subordinate to

the ground army and therefore involved in a great deal of ground-to-ground wireless traffic. This traffic is largely readable.

A 'Y' service must exploit all the radio manifestations of the 'enemy'. The behaviour of the Western allies was more readily and profitably followed by the interception and plotting of 'noises' than by interception and interpretation of signals, W/T and R/T. Hence preoccupation in the West with HYPERBEL (GEE), BUMERANG (OBOE), DISKUS (GEE H). The Eastern ether was not thus laden with noises: Russian navigation had not advanced beyond the point reached by any efficient civil air line in 1939.

It is to be assumed that the Russians will have overrun a good deal of German equipment, and have impressed German technicians. (For the rest, the Russians seem not to have had more than what the Western allies gave them.) It should be possible, by listening on known frequencies, quickly to discover whether the Russians are using captured equipment now.

- 2) FRIEDRICH interpreted his role as 'Y' 'ops.' (Personnel and Admin. were the province of Oberst FORSTER). Evaluation was delegated to:

Chi Stelle Ob.d.L.	contents of signals
Funkleitstand Ob.d.L.	route-tracking and the passing of the plots.

FRIEDRICH saw to it that the Regiments did what he ordered; he gave his orders in order to get the results he wanted (the results required were determined by himself in consultation with the forces of defense).

- 3) This order of battle and modus operandi meant that FRIEDRICH, for the East: served a vast amount of intelligence on the Russian Air Force to Ic.
for the West: was in actual contact with the 'enemy'

C) The experts representing ADI Science were fascinated by FRIEDRICH's story, his struggle to keep pace with the radio technological developments of the Western allies. At the end the score was still pretty even. ADI Science claimed (FRIEDRICH absent) that they had a thing or two in store at the end. He finished his account by speaking of agglomerations of jamming installations which he called 'Stoerdoerfer!'. They were going to put paid to various allied tricks.

The experts asked why, since FRIEDRICH knew so much about allied behaviour ('Behaviour' Gebahren, was almost a technical term with FRIEDRICH) the night fighters were never there. FRIEDRICH shrugged his shoulders: he doesn't think much of the night fighters of either side. (We gathered that he had had German night-fighters tracked, to see what they were up to).

When FRIEDRICH was plotting, on paper, an imaginary allied raid, and had indicated two incursions, we asked him how he distinguished main from feint incursions. A mixture of statistics, psychology etc. was the answer. He appended: I have always forbidden wireless deception; deception is worse than useless and inevitably betrays what it is meant to conceal.

D) For the rest, what FRIEDRICH said about his individual units is adequately covered in the records already available. It is worth adding:

Liaison between OKL and OKM 'Y' services was good at lower levels in the chain of command.

Coastal Command had always been a bone of contention between OKL and OKM. OKL 'Y' had it to the end, though the arrangement was never entirely satisfactory.

E) Cryptography

FRIEDRICH does not claim to be an expert in this field. (He was, moreover, tired by the time this subject was reached) He said in a previous interrogation: 'I had nothing from my cryptographers after 1942'. His view was that this was best left to VOEGELE.

1) The subject of American wireless teleprinter traffic, intercepted and broken by the Germans (see Notes on Interrogation I), was raised by interrogator. There is little doubt that FRIEDRICH wishes he had never mentioned it. Not necessarily because he thinks he has been insecure; he probably thinks the subject very uninteresting. One must, however, consider, having compared his previous with his present statements whether he is alarmed at having given the information gratuitously: he seems now to belittle the German achievement.

The previous report said:

"KAMERUN (Chi Stelle Ob.d.L., Referat B) when located at Paris-Asnieres had intercepted and broken US non-morse teleprinter traffic between Washington and Europe. This success was maintained throughout owing to the lamentable insecurity of the operators. The Germans had therefore always known all details of ferry flights, strength of US Air Force in Europe and a good deal about training and replacements."

This was not taken down verbatim. Interrogator would withdraw 'non-morse' in the above and leave it that FRIEDRICH said 'Funkfern-schreib' - i.e. wireless-teleprinter. The above is, moreover, based on what interrogator remembers FRIEDRICH to have said in the OKL barracks at Berchtesgaden. FRIEDRICH cannot be held to every phrase, therefore. But he does, in the following answers, appear to be minimising the claim (or is he endeavouring now to suggest that the success was scored against a less advanced form of wireless teleprinter, with which he is also familiar):

"Yes. It was a wireless teleprinter traffic from Washington State Department.

No. Not to Europe: to overseas W/T stations. It was a 'Zutraegerverkehr' (traffic passing on signals in bulk). There was an immense volume of traffic.

Breaking ceased when a new machine or a new 'Tastschritt' (keying tempo ?) was introduced.

Yes, there was a secrecy device, but it could be broken by the most primitive methods; there were 10 GAF WAAF only to cope with it. The traffic did not carry signals of any tactical importance.

No, this was not before, but after, the Americans entered the war. But breaking ceased a long time ago.

Yes, a special receiver had to be built. 'As far as I can remember, but I don't want to be bound to the statement, the receiver was built for me by a Feldwebel'.

The alphabet was a kind of morse substitution. What should have been A came out as, say, M. No, it was not this impulse business."

Interrogator laid off at this point. An independent statement by a member of VOEGELE's staff should be sought. It would also be useful to know whether FRIEDRICH talks to General MARTINI about his interview with us.

2) FRIEDRICH had previously said that RAF 4-figure became unbreakable after 1942. Sequel:

The 4-figure system changed, FRIEDRICH thinks, every year. In 1942 both the code and the 'Wurm' were changed. Work on the cipher continued, but without success.

3) VOEGELE was at the NEUER MARSTALL. He had 2 - 3 officers, 1 - 2 'Beamte' and (long pause for reflection) about 80 men. VOEGELE worked on hand ciphers generally, SYKO, RASTER and Air Movement Code.

It was VOEGELE who had the Hollerith machines. When he wanted one ordered he presented FRIEDRICH with a chit, which was automatically signed. They were ordinary Hollerith machines. Big machines? No, just ordinary Holleriths.

4) FRIEDRICH had never read an 'Activity-report of OKW/CHI'. Interrogator gave him an idea of how they run: "in the period x-y, so-and-so many signals were intercepted of which so-many were decoded; VN reports were issued etc. No, he had not seen any. Interrogator said that CHI Stelle was described as a recipient of VN reports. FRIEDRICH said 'Verlaessliche Nachrichten', - Yes, he used to read them but they were no use to him; he stopped reading them.

5) FRIEDRICH said that the ground-to-ground traffic issuing directions to our beam stations before raids were not readable 'I say that to put you at your ease'.